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Introduction
The use of facial recognition technology (FR) by public and private actors has stirred
controversy in recent months. There is a myriad of uses of facial recognition, some more ominous
than others. Apple uses FR to map the contours of a user’s face to restrict access to the user’s
phone.1 Coffee shops may incorporate facial recognition software into coffee makers to pour a
cup of coffee for a yawning passerby.2 Consternation over FR arises more often, however, when
the technology is used in less anodyne ways. Law enforcement’s use of FR has sparked outrage
among civil liberty activist groups, resulting in litigation over possible privacy infringements.3
Facial recognition service providers (FRSP’s) and tech investors watch these lawsuits carefully to
gauge where courts are drawing the boundaries by which FR use by the government is legally
permissible. But to understand the legality of government use of FR, we first have to understand
how it is frequently developed and applied.
Law enforcement has increasingly hired facial recognition service providers to code
software capable of “scraping” images off the Web. Web scraping is simply a term used to describe
various methods used to extract data from websites. These images are scraped from images posted
on third party platforms, including Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc.4 Subsequently, these images
are shifted and stored into the software’s database.
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Government interest in FR surged following the terrorist attacks on 9/11.5 Following the
Cold War, the United States did not have a major military hegemony to compete with. Instead, the
emerging enemy was “asymmetric threats” or, in other words, unidentifiable enemies targeting
“soft targets,” like malls and airports.6 Asymmetric threats do not play by conventional rules of
war. The United States realized it was going to be forced to employ unorthodox, legally suspect
ways to combat asymmetric threats. Around this timeframe, the United States was excelling in
technological development. The government viewed FR as an opportunity use its strengths in its
fight against these new threats. Biometrics industries sprung out of this time period.7 As innovation
spurred, robust FR systems were developed. To date, the system nearest to being able to identify
faces in a crowd using real-time surveillance is the Biometric Optical Surveillance System
(BOSS).8 Developed through funding from the Department of Homeland Security, BOSS is still
used today. BOSS can use video cameras to scan people in public and then identify the names of
individuals by cross-referencing their faces with other databases.9
Today law enforcement agencies can access similar databases at any time for its
investigations. For example, if a convenience-store camera captures footage of a burglar breaking
and entering the store, assuming the image is of high enough quality, law enforcement can use the
software to match the image with one of the images in its database. Technological advancements
in the fields of photography and videography, however, have facilitated better opportunities for
stock images, worthy of facial recognition, to appear in image databases.10 Matching the image
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does not necessarily have to be executed manually. The software can unilaterally measure the
biometric landmarks of a person’s face, including the nose, face, eyes, skin pores and pair those
results with another image in the database to find a match. Law enforcement has used this tool to
shave time usually spent on investigations from weeks to mere hours.11
Some argue this tool greatly enhances civil liberty and dignity by reducing the pool of
suspects; thus, reducing the costs and humiliation entailed in being a suspect in a criminal
investigation.12 Facial recognition technology has the potential to greatly enhance policing and
government security efficiency in the United States. The advancement of FR could potentially
accomplish in seconds what would take hundreds or thousands of man-hours to complete
manually. The decades-long development of FR is coming to a point where, in the near future,
personal information about people can be so quickly accessed that their identity, location, and
other personal information can be determined and logged within seconds. This technology, if left
unregulated by law, should be particularly troubling to those who have no reason to be concerned
with law enforcement surveillance. Richard Posner, an American jurist, argues that when privacy
values are compared to security from terror-related deaths often associated with asymmetric
tactics, privacy should lose to security.13 Posner goes even further in a later writing, arguing that
individuals often use privacy law as a cover for the disreputable parts of our character.14 Posner,
like many others, share the view that privacy rights are overvalued and diminish very little
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freedom. However, the slippery-slope concerns that privacy advocates have about the FR’s
potential for extensive abuse may not be completely without merit, as we will see.
FR certainly has its public benefits. But it is also a tool that can be easily abused if placed
in the wrong hands. China has employed a vast network surveillance system using FR to monitor
and rank people based on their behaviors. This so-called “social credit system” imposes rewards
and punishments on individuals based on the scores they receive. For example, behaviors like
jaywalking and buying videogames have been deemed punishment-worthy behaviors that, if
caught red-handed by the network, can lead to lower social credit. Some of the punishments for
low social credit include restrictions on travel, employment opportunities, and school choice.15
China presents an example of the draconian use of FR, but the use of the technology in the
United States has not been nearly as eerie. Many police departments have made clear that they do
not engage in mass data gathering (e.g., placing cameras on street corners). Instead most police
departments are transparent about their use of FR to local communities to convey an image of
responsibility, professionalism, and to avoid media backlash.16 Clearview AI, a FRSP, has
professed to only scraping publicly available images off social media sites.17 Compared to China’s
social credit system, these uses are anodyne; however, concern about the ethics of FR gathering
and application are growing among members of the private sector. Axon, a major police body
camera manufacturer, has rejected selling FR, citing the findings of an independent ethics panel
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which found FR to not be advanced enough for law enforcement to depend on.18 Microsoft recently
announced its refusal to continue investing in AnyVision, a FRSP, due to oversight concerns.19
Facebook and Twitter have sent cease-and-desist letters to Clearview AI, demanding it stop
scraping images off their websites in violation of their terms-of-service.20
Government crackdowns on FR have moved at warp speed. Legislators in San Francisco
have already imposed an outright ban on government use of FR. But that’s not all. Additionally,
any new plans to purchase FR must now be approved by city administrators. These measures are
deemed drastic by some, especially among members of the law enforcement community. Some
believe that a moratorium is more appropriate, as opposed to an outright ban. Experts believe that
as the technology develops, ways to limit FR to responsible use will bloom. Senators Jeff Merkley
(Oregon) and Cory Booker (New Jersey) have proposed a bill that would do just that. The bill,
proposed in February, calls for a moratorium on using the technology until a commission
recommends guidelines and limitations for government use.21 The bill does not restrict private
purchases of FR.
Federal consumer privacy laws are generally ineffective at hampering abuse of an
individual’s personal information. There are a few reasons for this. For one, privacy law in the
United States operates across subject matters (e.g., COPPA for children, HIPAA for health
services, etc.) There is no blanket statutory regime governing consumer privacy. Second, consumer
information has been protected by a self-regulatory regime articulated by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC). This model, known as “notice and choice,” encourages firms to adopt
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substantive information protections via “privacy by design” and disclosure of its data collection
practices to consumers. The notice-and-choice model was extended into the FTC’s best practices
guideline for facial recognition, including a policy directing that digital signage using the
technology not be set up where kids congregate.22
Privacy by design incorporates substantive consumer protections into the firm’s practices
including data security, reasonable limits on data collection, comprehensive data management
procedures, and sound data retention and accuracy practices.23 This model works as an
intermediary between strict regulation and entrepreneurial freedom. Most policies, however, do
not comply with FTC guidelines.24 Although FTC threats of regulation have given firms an
incentive to reign in irresponsible data collection practices, the FTC’s ability to sanction for
noncompliance is limited and actions brought by the FTC are frequently based on firms
misrepresenting practices outlined in its privacy policy.
The Stored Communications Act of 1986 will only provide a temporary sigh of relief to
privacy advocates. Companies that store and transmit user data are generally prohibited from
“knowingly” sharing those records with the government.25 But this does not put and end to the
commercialization of biometric data. FRSP’s are free to transmit data to other private parties such
as data brokers. Data brokers are firms that buy and sell information about individuals for the
purpose of aggregating the data to create individual profiles.26 This information may range from
individual pieces of information, like age or weight, to more sensitive information, like webbrowsing histories, bank card transaction records, and driving records. FRSP’s may even operate
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as a data broker operation. This would allow them to sell biometric information directly to law
enforcement, assuming no other state restriction bars the transaction. Clearview AI is an example
of a FRSP that operates as a data broker.
As you have seen thus far, attitudes towards facial recognition gathering methods and
application are somewhat mixed in the current climate. There is a sense that lawmakers and
investors are becoming increasingly queasy about the ethics of its use. But as the technology
develops and effective measures to reign in corrupt practices are discovered, its potential to be
used as a robust crime-fighting tool is promising. This prospect makes FR a potentially rewarding
space for tech startups and investors. In fact, market reports project the facial recognition industry
to grow and develop in the coming years.27 Factors driving the market include increased
technological advancements across verticals, a growing surveillance market, and rise in defense
deployment. However, in light of the maelstrom of landmark global and domestic events in recent
months including the impeachment of President Trump and the effects of the COVID-19
pandemic, large-scale public debate over this topic has not come to full fruition. Most Americans
may even find the topic overly confusing or obscure. This leaves the FR space at the mercy of an
unforeseen shift in political sentiment. Should the sentiment cut against government use of FR,
FRSP’s will have to discover novel and creative ways to employ the technology that comport with
new laws—or abandon the project altogether.
But what happens if public sentiment remains mixed on government use of FR as a crimefighting tool? Given the volatility of this political climate, it isn’t unreasonable to assume that
debate on this subject will continue to be pushed to the backburner of most political agendas. Keep
in mind, most states have not passed any explicit restrictions on FR. More importantly, Illinois,
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Texas, and Washington are the only states to have passed legislation providing individuals with a
private cause of action for having their biometric information collected.28 This means in the other
forty-seven (47) states, FRSP’s are mostly free to engage in scraping. This poses a problem for
staunch privacy advocates. In the face of a porous privacy regime and distracted state legislatures
there is a severe lack of weapons in their arsenal to combat FR gathering and use. Consequently,
in light of the growing prevalence of FR use in law enforcement, criminal defendants identified by
FR will be on the front lines in the war against the technology using the Fourth Amendment as
both sword and shield.
I.

The Biometrics Industry

FRSP’s operate within the biometrics industry. The mass collection of biometric information
has expanded rapidly in the past decade. According to a market research report by Application,
Technology, Function, & Geography, “the biometrics market is expected to reach $32.73 billion
by 2022.”29 More recent forecasts have the biometric technology market surpassing $44 billion
globally by 2021.30 This could be due to the combination of spiraling use of the technology and
lack of regulation the space. To put it simply, biometrics are biological measurements.31 Any
physiological or behavioral trait can be characterized as a biometric characteristic. Examples
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include hand geometry, fingerprints, DNA, retina, iris, or ear features, and—relevant to our
purposes—faceprints.32
The term “biometrics” is also used to describe a system. Biometric systems consist of three
basic components: first, a device that captures the biometric characteristic; second, “software to
convert the scanned biometric data into a standardized digital format and to compare [relevant]
match points;” and third, “[a] database to securely store biometric data for comparison.33 The
biometric information is compiled in a database, which are used to create an algorithm of an
individual’s biometric characteristics. In the context of FR, this would include biometric nodes on
one’s face.34 Once in the database, the data can be used to verify an individual or identify an
unknown person using new information.35
The government and private businesses gather vast amounts of biometric data for a myriad of
purposes. Private companies buy and sell this information to each other, and in some cases, directly
to the government, creating a commercialized industry for sensitive information.36 Readers new to
this space may be new to the value such information has to innovators. Biometric characteristics
provide extraordinarily unique datasets for many companies, not just law enforcement. For
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example, if a patient cannot communicate their symptoms, a provider can scan the patient’s voice
and access his/her records to identify the illness.37
Businesses are using biometric data in ways the average consumer may engage with daily
without recognizing. Companies may employ biometric technologies to increase efficiency and
reduce fraud. Consider a modern update to the time clock for employees logging in and out of
work. Biometric readers allow workers to simply tap their fingerprints onto a biometric fingerprint
scanner, as opposed to punching a timecard. This can reduce a practice called “buddy-time”
punching to increase workplace efficiency and accountability.38 Many tanning salons and gyms
allow members to enter and use the facility by simply using a fingerprint scanner.39 Banks are
researching ways to use biometric data to curb identity theft, and some have successfully
implemented measures. Citi Bank has introduced a voice authentication system to identify the
identities of customers explaining issues to customer service representatives over the phone.40
Wells Fargo uses eye-print authentication as an added security layer for clients to view account
balances, make deposits, and approve payments from mobile devices.41 Even more interesting is
Barclays’s Finger Vein reader Technology. customers simply place a finger inside a small desktop
scanner instead of entering passwords and PINs.42
Biometric technologies clearly provide a boost to consumer experience, but the
commercialization of such sensitive data appears to create perverse incentives. We are now in a
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situation where the business gathers intimate, personal information and sells it to buyers that
consumers may not have wished to expose themselves to, like the government. And the United
States privacy regime does not give individuals the power to protect their privacy by controlling
the personal data gathered, collected, stored, and sold by the private industry.43 This is problematic
given the “private industry tracks 24/7 our physical location, online travels, friends, activities, likes
and dislikes, preferences (including religious and sexual), personal status (married, divorced, or
single), and financial status. Such tracking is accomplished in myriad ways and, more increasingly,
it is done using individuals’ biometric identifiers.”44 Later on you will see that this is a concern for
Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court.45
The companies mentioned thus far that have employed biometric technologies are considered
FRSP’s for purposes of this project. These companies use biometric technology in what many may
consider to be anodyne ways. However, the main concern that privacy advocates have is the
sharing of this information—and not necessarily with other private companies, but with data
brokers. As mentioned in the Introduction section of this project, data brokers. Recall that data
brokers are firms that buy and sell information about individuals for the purpose of aggregating
the data to create individual profiles.46 Data brokers, unlike companies that typically employ FR,
don’t deal directly with consumers, allowing them to sell information directly to the government.
Consumers may be inadvertently conveying private information to the government via private
businesses that sell their biometric data to data brokers.
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II.

How Facial Recognition Technology is Used
Before traversing through the legal terrain of FR, it’s important to know how the

technology works in practice. Although the thought of FR seems hyper-futuristic, the technology
is currently used in many ways. The technology is easy to understand when broken down step by
step. This method of learning helps avoid thinking about facial recognition in an overly abstract
fashion that clouds our judgment in assessing FR’s position in the legal terrain.
Consumers may purchase a facial recognition camera with the technology already
embedded or can reconfigure the components of the camera to function as a facial recognition
camera. The latter may take considerable time and effort to execute, so most consumers simply
purchase a camera with facial recognition already embedded. The camera will then capture an
image of a face, alone or in a crowd.47 FR strays from traditional surveillance in the sense that the
typical camera captures naked images. FR captures and measures an individual’s biometric
nodes.48 Examples of biometric nodes include the distance between the nose and eyes, the amount
and type of skin pores one has, and relative position of the nose, jaws, and cheekbones.49
Individuals will often be under the mistaken impression that the camera is operating as a traditional
security layer when in fact it is collecting biometric data.50 Many grocery stores, schools, and
airports use facial recognition cameras.51
The analysis of a face is then turned into a mathematical formula.52 These facial features
become numbers in a code. This numerical code is called a faceprint. Similar to the unique
structure of a thumbprint, each person has their own faceprint. That faceprint is then compared to
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a database comprised of other faceprints and finds a match if available. Law enforcement mostly
uses FR for investigatory leads because such evidence is not yet admissible in most courts.53 The
FBI has access to more than 641 million photos, including 21 state databases such as Division of
Motor Vehicles (DMV).54 There are questions as to the technology’s ability to accurately identify
a match. A report on the use of face recognition in the UK found that the technology led to false
matches over 90 percent of the time.55 Academic research has also already shown that face
recognition is less accurate for non-white faces and women.56 Law enforcement primarily employs
FR in two scenarios: When a suspect has been detained but there is no other way to identify the
suspect, or when footage of an unidentified suspect is captured.57 Assuming the image is of
sufficient quality, law enforcement will input the suspect’s faceprint into the system to identify a
potential match.58
III.

The Inefficiency of Traditional Fourth Amendment Doctrine in the Context of Big Data
Cybersurveillance
Applying the Fourth Amendment in the Digital Age has been a common cause for

consternation among judges. Since Katz v. United States, the “reasonable expectation of privacy”
standard has governed the Fourth Amendment analysis.59 The court strayed from its original
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private-public space distinction and adopted a reasonableness standard.60 If the suspect exhibits a
reasonable expectation of privacy and the public at-large is prepared to recognize that expectation
as reasonable, then the government must execute a search warrant before surveilling the suspect.61
But discerning what actions are reasonable to a law enforcement officer in the cyber context
proves difficult. Courts approach this inquiry by balancing the government’s interests in the search
and the privacy interests of the individual. If the government’s interests outweigh the individual’s
interests, the search is reasonable. Whether a search is reasonable, however, rests on the
assumption that the search is a readily identifiable act over a readily identifiable period of time.
This assumption allows courts to categorically determine situations and contexts where society
would expect a reasonable expectation of privacy. For example, cars have been held to be less
private than homes. Probable cause need only be shown to search a car, but a warrant is almost
always needed to search a house.
There are ample exceptions to the need for a search warrant. Relevant to FR gathering,
there is the third-party doctrine. When a person hands over personal information to a private third
party, that person has presumptively forfeited his reasonable expectation of privacy.62 United
States v. Carpenter, however, has carved an exception to this exception for cell phone data.63
Another relevant exception is the plain-view doctrine. When a person is engaged in unlawful
activity in a manner open for public view, he forfeits his reasonable expectation of privacy.64 Law
enforcement frequently relies on these exceptions to justify big data surveillance of suspects. There
are many other exceptions to warrants that are not as relevant to FR data gathering and application.
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There are unique contexts whereby courts disregard the existence of a plausible exception.
Cell-site data is an example where the data is so intrusive as to outweigh the application of the
third-party doctrine.65 Moreover, government use of technology not available for public use
generally has been deemed a search. In Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme Court determined that
law enforcement’s use of thermal imaging technology to obtain information from the inside of a
home constituted a search.66 Even though law enforcement was on a public street at the time, the
use of the thermal imaging to obtain information that would otherwise have required law
enforcement to enter the home concerned the Court.67 Some scholars have considered the
application of Kyllo in terms of the limited availability of thermal imaging to FR.68
The gathering of biometric nodes alone might pose a Fourth Amendment problem per se.
A fair argument could be made that individuals always have a subjective reasonable expectation
of their biometric nodes. Individuals have consistently been held to have forfeited their subjective
expectation of privacy when walking out in public. But how far does that expectation go? A
married couple may not possess a subjective expectation of privacy when promenading through
the park, but does it necessarily follow that they subjected themselves to having the measurement
between their nose and eyes measured and their skin pores counted? The courts have not ruled on
this question yet. However, as the public’s awareness of biometric data gathering increases, the
societal expectation of privacy decreases; thus, eroding privacy rights.69
As big data cybersurveillance grew increasingly sophisticated, judges’ frustration with the
traditional Katz test kept pace. Courts became jaded by the traditional common law approach,
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yearning for a new, capable set of tools to navigate the legal universe of big data cybersurveillance.
These frustrations are best illuminated in Judge Leon’s opinion in Klayman v. Obama: “the Smith
pen register and the ongoing NSA Bulk Telephony Metadata Program have so many significant
distinctions between them that I cannot possibly navigate these uncharted Fourth Amendment
waters using as my North Star a case that predates the rise of cell phones.”70 As mentioned
previously, the principal area of frustration in applying the traditional Fourth Amendment analysis
to big data cybersurveillance seems to be the fundamental axiom on which the analysis rests—
That all government action can be analyzed as an isolated event. In United States v. Maynard, the
D.C. Circuit introduced a different approach dubbed the "mosaic theory" of the Fourth Amendment
by legal scholars.71 Under the mosaic theory, searches can be analyzed as a collective sequence of
steps rather than as individual steps. To fully understand the mosaic theory, it is important to flesh
out the facts of Maynard and dissect the legal reasoning at the Circuit Court and Supreme Court
levels.
IV.

The Genesis of the Mosaic Theory

Antoine Jones owned and operated a nightclub in Washington D.C.72 In 2004 he came under
suspicion of drug trafficking and was the main target of a law enforcement investigation.73 Various
methods were used to investigate Jones including visual surveillance of the nightclub and wiretaps
on his cell phone.74 Using the information gathered from these methods, the Government obtained
a warrant from the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to install a GPS tracking device
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(GPS) on the car of Jones’s wife.75 The warrant authorized installation of the device for ten (10)
days, but the agents were unable to install the device until the eleventh day.76 The GPS was
installed on the car for twenty-eight (28) days, tracking the vehicle’s movements.77 The GPS
communicated Jones’s location to a government computer, consisting of 2,000 pages of data over
the twenty-eight (28) day span.78
Jones was convicted at trial and appealed. The trial court’s admission of the GPS evidence was
based on the Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Knotts.79 Knotts permitted the use of a
radio beeper located in a car that broadcasted the car's location to the police nearby.80 The legal
theory in Knotts was that an individual who willingly drives on public roads “willingly conveys”
to the public that anyone can look at where they’re travelling at any time. In other words, Jones
relinquished his expectation of privacy when he drove through public roads, therefore, the
installation of the GPS did not require a warrant.
Jones argued on appeal that GPS is distinguishable from a beeper.81 GPS gathers so much data
about a person’s physical movements across time and space as to intrude into the private details
of that person’s life. The D.C. Circuit agreed with Jones and reversed his conviction. Judge
Douglas Ginsburg first tackled the distinction between GPS and beepers. He explained that Knotts
was distinguishable because Knotts did not involve a “dragnet-type law enforcement practice” as
used against Jones.82 Jones’s case involved 24-hour surveillance; Knotts’s case did not. Ginsburg
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held that that different constitutional principles apply to dragnet-type law enforcement practices
like 24-hour GPS surveillance.83
Ginsberg’s brilliant sleight of hand from Knotts facilitated a smooth transition into the genesis
of the mosaic theory—the tool that judges, including Judge Leon, across the country have been
longing for. The court held that Jones’s movements were not constructively exposed through the
observable nature of each individual movement because the whole reveals more than does the sum
of its parts.84 This is where the mosaic analogy comes in. Judge Ginsburg reasoned that individual
pieces of data—when viewed collectively—can equal more than the sum of its parts.85 A single
piece of tile in a mosaic is just a single tile, which tells nothing. But if enough tiles are collected,
after careful thought, one can paint the whole picture. Because society would find Jones’s
expectation of privacy over the intimate details of his life over a month-long period to be
reasonable, the government’s warrantless GPS installation was unconstitutional. The mosaic
framework opens the possibility that a series of nonsearches by law enforcement could amount to
a search.
The Supreme Court unanimously agreed with Ginsburg’s conclusion that Jones was the subject
of a search but the rationales differed.86 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that the
installation of the GPS was a trespass on the “effects” of the car, relying on the public-private
trespass distinction used frequently prior to Katz.87 The mosaic theory was never mentioned in his
opinion. Five Justices wrote or joined opinions that did, however, touch on the mosaic theory.
Justice Alito was joined by four other Justices in his concurring opinion.88 He found Knotts to be
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applicable but narrowly read Knotts as applying to short-term monitoring of a person’s
movements. Justice Alito believed that law enforcement was not capable of the twenty-eight (28)
day monitoring of Jones without the use of GPS.89
Alito’s opinion is interesting for a few reasons. Justice Alito applied the reasonable expectation
of privacy test by invoking expectations of how law enforcement investigate particular crimes.90
He argues that society would not consider law enforcement capable of tracking the movements of
a vehicle without GPS.91 Justice Alito does not appear to completely write off the use of GPS
tracking in a criminal investigation, however. It is critical to keep in mind that Justice Alito did
not consider Jones’s offenses “extraordinary.” As such, the GPS monitoring was beyond what
society would deem reasonable.92 What makes this reasoning somewhat cryptic is his scant
citations to authority. This reasoning seems to shift from what the public might see (i.e., the
behavior the individual in question is believed to have engaged in) to what society would expect
law enforcement to do given the circumstances. This is a fascinating, nuanced approach
considering the mosaic theory has the effect of cracking down on intrusive technologies. But this
reasoning suggests that maybe BOSS employed by a government agency, paired with the use of
other investigatory techniques, could be perfectly legal when used in the context of asymmetric
threats. Therefore, with the exception of more serious offenses, society Justice Alito did not find
the extensiveness of the search in question reasonable considering the lack of seriousness of
Jones’s offense.93
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The fifth Justice to apply the mosaic theory was Justice Sotomayor. She reasoned that the use
of GPS was unique in that GPS has the capability of shining a light onto the precise details of one’s
life:94
I would take these attributes of GPS monitoring into account when considering the
existence of a reasonable societal expectation of privacy in the sum of one's public
movements. I would ask whether people reasonably expect that their movements
will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to
ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and
so on.95
She suggested that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in “the sum of” their
public movements.96 Justice Alito and Justice Sotomayor appear to interpret the mosaic theory
slightly differently. Justice Alito focuses on the relation of law enforcement’s techniques to the
particular crime in question. The more serious the offense, the more extensive techniques the
government can employ in its investigation.97
Sotomayor’s reasoning mirrors Judge Douglas Ginsburg’s reasoning. As such, using the
previous analogy, BOSS employed by a government agency, paired with the use of other
investigatory techniques, may be illegal—even when used in the context of asymmetric threats.
This is because Justice Sotomayor appears to focus on the quantity of data collected versus
society’s expectation of the methods employed by law enforcement when balanced against the
offense committed. This is still, however, somewhat cryptic. How much information is too much?
How intimate is too intimate? By what standard of intelligence are we measuring the degree of
intimacy against? Undoubtedly, a smarter individual is more capable of drawing inferences than
less-smart individuals. Questions like these raise the issue of applying Sotomayor and Ginsburg’s
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version of the mosaic theory. Both Justices, however, measure the collective sum of the
government action in determining whether a search occurs—the key takeaway for FRSP’s.
Law enforcement has been paying close attention to how the mosaic theory is interpreted by
courts. The FBI turned off 3,000 tracking devices shortly after the Jones opinion was handed
down.98 This reflects the effect that the impetus of Fourth Amendment doctrine might be having
on the biometric industry in spite of its positive trends. The uncertainty of the mosaic theory, in
particular, raises problems. As mentioned, Justice Alito’s approach seems to be less restrictive on
biometric technology applications in contexts involving serious offenses. In contrast, Justice
Sotomayor’s approach provides no such safety net. This approach would be problematic for
biometric technology providers—and especially FRSP’s due to the private nature of faceprints.
V.

The Effects of Fourth Amendment Doctrine on Facial Recognition Service Providers

Although the Fourth Amendment has been traditionally applied to state action, FRSP’s would
be wise to harmonize their gathering methods with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The main
reason being that most FRSP’s, depending on how significantly sales of biometric data contribute
to their revenue stream, don’t want to risk having to erase their already-stored data and reshape
their gathering methods should the courts come along and clamp down on indirect Fourth
Amendment abuses. It’s not clear that the government is permitted to do something indirectly that
is prohibited from doing directly. For example, let’s assume the a database a FRSP conveys to law
enforcement contains images of persons possessing a reasonable expectation of privacy (i.e., if
law enforcement were to have gathered the image, it would have been a violation of the
individual’s Fourth Amendment right). Can law enforcement access that image without a search
warrant? As we already know, there are no statutory restrictions on data brokers selling a person’s
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personal information directly to law enforcement. But the lack of attention on voluntary datasharing between law enforcement and the private sector is both problematic and puzzling.99
Chief Justice Roberts made clear that if police want access to seven (7) days’ worth or more
of cell-site data from companies like Verizon or AT&T, a warrant is needed.100 This logic would
seem to apply whether the government is subpoenaing the data or buying it. To be clear,
government contracts to purchase data from FRSP’s that operate as data brokers do not currently
evoke the Fourth Amendment.101 But in light of Carpenter, there’s no telling whether the courts
could step in and prevent indirect Fourth Amendment infringements in the future.
FRSP’s, especially those operating as data brokers, would be wise to scrape images of persons
who have clearly forfeited their reasonable expectation of privacy. For example, photos posted on
social media and video surveillance of individuals at parks or malls. Also, FRSP’s should limit the
amount of information they gather when scraping so as to avoid painting a mosaic of a person’s
life. For example, the technology should go no further than scraping the biometric nodes and name
of the individual. Information such as the individual’s employment, education, relationships, or
the like should strongly be discouraged from gathering. The technology should be geared to gather
biometric nodes and biometric nodes, alone. Keep in mind that individuals currently have no
federal cause of action to remove information from a privacy merchant’s records.
This advice may not appear to be commercially mellifluous to the ear of a FRSP. On first
intuition, the recommendations thus far would appear to render the product less marketable
compared to the product containing private, intimate details held by other FRSP’s. But consider
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the impetus of Fourth Amendment doctrine in recent years. The idea of purchasing a pandora’s
box of potentially overly private information may be exactly what the government wishes to avoid.
The government doesn’t want data that they could not access without a search warrant. More
importantly, the government does not want to use data as evidence that eventually falls victim to
an exclusionary-rule theory at trial. The government wants to spend precious budgetary resources
on reliable, durable data. Also remember that government officials like police officers are
employing a vast array of tools in a criminal investigation. Intimate, personal information relating
to, for example, a person’s job history, banking records, etc., may not just be irrelevant, but
redundant. Police departments want to use FR in as limited capacity as possible so as to avoid bigbrother depictions by the defense during the prosecution.
This project has laid out potential permanent blockades to government use of FR. What
then? Should the federal moratorium, or ban, on FR be signed into law, all hope is not lost for
FRSP’s. You may recall the discussion at the beginning of this note about how the technology is
still developing. Experts believe that as the technology develops, ideas and methods for curbing
abuse of the technology will keep pace. Moreover, there is no discussion of banning the sale or
manufacturing of the technology itself. Private businesses—in conformity with biometric privacy
laws, among others—will always have an interest in using the technology.
What if courts grow overly suspicious of FR and hold that individuals always have a
subjective or societal expectation of privacy? In this event, data brokers that have successfully
managed to commercialize biometric information may have to diversify their client base. This base
could include actors that perform operations in a similar capacity to the government, such as
private investigators and security firms. Recall the discussion about the present flourishing of the
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facial recognition market.102 One of the factors driving the market’s growth is a rise in defense
deployment.103 FRSP’s could assess the needs of military forces and defense contractors to tailor
the technology to their needs in an area where U.S. privacy laws are laxer in application.104
As it stands, investments in facial recognition technology are on the rise.105 To maintain
this trend, FRSP’s would be wise to conform to FTC guidelines as both a legal and—more
importantly—a public-relations solution. The biggest threat to facial recognition is the public. If
abuse or other corrupt practices draw unwanted attention, the industry may wake the sleeping
giant. Investors know this. Bad publicity feeds into the uncertainty surrounding the legality of FR,
and too much uncertainty persuades investors to look elsewhere. Tech investors are well-known
risk-takers, but only to an extent.
This project has focused mostly on the slippery-slope implications of FR under current law
and where the law could take a sour turn for FRSP’s. This is due to the trajectory of Fourth
Amendment doctrine in recent years. But keep in mind, the reverse could also occur. As time
passes, courts could hold that due to the ubiquity of technology and social media and the public’s
enhanced awareness of private data sharing, we willfully forfeit our Fourth Amendment rights in
many contexts.106 In her book, Taking Liberties: The War on Terror and the Erosion of American
Democracy, Susan N. Herman says, “familiarity breeds acceptance.”107 She writes, “Once we
become accustomed to a new baseline, like bag searches or body scanners at the airport, those
practices, like the idea of watchlists, are likely to proliferate.”108 She explains that once these
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measures are introduced, they become commonplace; And we breed an acceptance to these safety
measures without truly understanding their effectiveness.109
Such an outcome would prove a boon to FRSP’s acting as data brokers. With the mosaic
theory still holding as the minority position of analyzing Fourth Amendment issues in the context
of big data cybersurveillance, FR would meet the Katz test. This is, however, unlikely for a few
reasons. For one, the majority of society is still largely unaware of the prevalence and scope of
private and public data sharing.110 This unawareness, however, should not be confused with
indifference.111 Second, such a maneuver would practically scrap the Fourth Amendment
completely in a time where technology is the primary tool in criminal investigations. Third, courts
prefer leaving sensitive issues such as this to the states. This is another reason why the duration
and scope of FR gathering and use is largely at the mercy of public sentiment.
Conclusion
The war between privacy concerns surrounding FR and the utility of FR as a robust
crime-fighting tool is a fascinating one. The weakness of privacy regimes at the federal and state
level in this area have left staunch privacy advocates to mostly rely on criminal defendants
fighting FR on Fourth Amendment theories. A federal ban on government use of facial
recognition has been drafted, but in light of the maelstrom of landmark global and domestic
events in recent months, public support surrounding its passage remains uncertain. FRSP’s
operating as data brokers are mostly free to engage in scraping and sell personal information
directly to the government but should proceed with caution. Information related to the personal,
intimate details of one’s life should be avoided in the event the mosaic theory becomes widely
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adopted. FRSP’s should have contingency plans in place in the event the logic in Carpenter
extends to contracts between data brokers and law enforcement. These contingency plans should
include the diversification of client bases and compliance with the FTC’s best practices guideline
for facial recognition. The FR market is flourishing, but efforts to avoid investor uncertainty
need to improve to maintain these trends.
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